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THE FINKELSTEIN INQUIRY:  MISCARRIED 






Laws are generally found to be nets of such a texture, 
as the little creep through, 





The Australian media’s nervous wait for the outcome of media 
regulation reform initiatives came to an abrupt and ignominious 
end in March 2013 as the moves collapsed.  The Federal 
Government withdrew a package of Bills at the eleventh hour, when 
it became apparent that the Bills would not garner the required 
support in parliament.  These Bills were preceded by two major 
media inquiries – the Convergence Review and the Independent 
Media Inquiry – culminating in reports released in 2012.  The latter 
initiative contained sweeping reform recommendations, including 
one for the formation of a government-funded ‘super regulator’ 
called the News Media Council, which the media generally feared 
would spell doom especially for those engaged in the ‘news’ 
business.  This article examines the origins of the Independent 
Media Inquiry; the manner of the inquiry’s conduct; what problem 
the inquiry was seeking to address; the consequent 
recommendations; and ultimately, the manoeuvres for legislative 
action and the reform initiative’s demise.  This article concludes 
that the Independent Media Inquiry was flawed from the outset and 
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that it missed a golden opportunity for effecting reform, the need for 
which even the media acknowledged. 
I INTRODUCTION 
It is not unusual nor is it entirely objectionable for governments to 
regulate the media.  For all the protestations proponents make about the 
sanctity of the freedom of speech ideal, it is often not acknowledged that 
freedom of speech is not absolute and that just as much as there is a 
public interest in safeguarding freedom of speech, on occasion, 
countervailing public interests demand that freedom of speech should 
yield to such interests.  These countervailing public interests are 
sometimes protected through regulatory intervention.  Australian media 
regulation has traditionally comprised a trinity of regulation, co-
regulation and self-regulation.  The previous occasion on which the 
Australian media experienced sustained regulatory encroachment came 
about in the period post-September 11, which triggered a variety of 
measures aimed at safeguarding national security.  In that case, the 
impact on the media was incidental in the sense that legislative measures 
that were introduced were not primarily media-specific but rather a part 
of a general exercise to address national security concerns.  The media in 
their roles as gatekeepers of news and information, as self-proclaimed 
vanguards of freedom of speech and as self-appointed watchdogs on 
government, is especially well equipped to articulate its resistance to 
encroachments or threats of encroachments on freedom of speech 
generally.  As it became apparent that the 2012 reviews would serve as a 
springboard for new legislative measures that could impact heavily on the 
media’s activities, the Australian media went into overdrive to register its 
stout opposition.  Regulation and freedom of speech are uneasy 
bedfellows.  Media regulation impacts directly on freedom of speech, a 
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core value in any democratic society.  Regulation is also the media’s 
nemesis because the media’s raison d’etre and fortunes rest heavily on 
being unfettered.  In 2011 a precipitation of several factors put media 
regulation high on the Australian government’s agenda and ignited a push 
for stricter media regulation.  One ignition factor was the ‘phone hacking 
scandal’, which led to media inquiries in the United Kingdom, including 
the Leveson Inquiry.  Those inquiries exposed a litany of ethical and legal 
breaches by the British media.
2
  The other ignition factor was a 
perception, mostly at Australian Federal Government level and in the 
Australian Greens party, that the Australian media too was culpable of 
transgressions and needed to be restrained.  The Federal Government 
established the Independent Media Inquiry (referred to in the article as 
the Finkelstein Inquiry, named after the head of the inquiry, former 
Federal Court judge, Ray Finkelstein QC), to supplement the work of 
another review – the Convergence Review.  At its base these inquiries 
were aimed at ensuring that media regulation keeps apace with 
contemporary needs.  Advances in communications technology were 
rightly recognised as having rendered some aspects of the prevailing 
regulatory framework obsolete, not least of all because of the inconsistent 
approaches taken across the different media platforms.  This created a 
variety of conundrums for the government, the regulators, media outlets 
and news media consumers.  Longstanding tolerance of self-regulation by 
the media came under fresh scrutiny.  The thrust for regulatory reform 
emanating through the Convergence and Finkelstein reviews were 
juxtaposed with another relevant, but unrelated development a few years 
                                           
2
  See Culture, Media and Sport Committee, UK House of Commons, News 
International and Phone-hacking: Eleventh Report of Session 2010–12, (2012), vol 1, 
[2], which refers to ‘three separate inquiries into press standards’.  See also Lord 
Justice Brian Leveson, Report to UK Parliament, An Inquiry into the Culture, 
Practices and Ethics of the Press, 29 November 2012. 
26 Fernandez, The Finkelstein Inquiry 2013 
 
 
earlier – the concerted media crusade mounted by Australia’s Right to 
Know Coalition to remove burgeoning officially imposed impediments to 
the media’s ability to perform its proper role. 
II ORIGINS, OBJECTS, AND METHODS OF THE FINKELSTEIN 
INQUIRY 
The Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, 
Stephen Conroy on 14 September 2011 announced the establishment of 
the Independent Media Inquiry.  The terms of reference were: 
(a) the effectiveness of the current media codes of practice in 
Australia, particularly in light of technological change that is 
leading to the migration of print media to digital and online 
platforms;  
(b) the impact of this technological change on the business model 
that has supported the investment by traditional media organisations 
in quality journalism and the production of news, and how such 
activities can be supported, and diversity enhanced, in the changed 
media environment;  
(c) ways of substantially strengthening the independence and 
effectiveness of the Australian Press Council, including in relation 
to online publications, and with particular reference to the handling 
of complaints; and  
(d) any related issues pertaining to the ability of the media to 
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Two themes emerged from the Minister’s announcement and related 
comments.  One favoured media independence and freedom.  The other 
leaned towards increased control over the media.  In respect of the former 
– the favouring of media independence and freedom – the Minister, in his 
official statement when announcing the inquiry, stated: ‘A healthy and 
robust media is essential to the democratic process.’
4
  The Minister 
added: 
The Australian Government believes it is incumbent upon 
Government to ensure regulatory processes and industry structures 
are sufficiently strong to support the continuation of a healthy and 
independent media that is able to fulfil its essential democratic 
purpose, and to operate in the public interest.
5
 
Despite this profession of a commitment to fostering a healthy and robust 
media, however, no reference or commitment was made to these ideals in 
the Finkelstein Inquiry’s terms of reference.  Given the potential enormity 
of the impact of regulatory moves on freedom of speech, whether directly 
or incidentally, it ought to have been reflected more acutely in the terms 
of reference and the concomitant measures that were proposed.  In 
respect of the second theme, it is arguable that the third and fourth items 
in the terms of reference manifested a control imperative.
6
  Substantially 
strengthening the independence and effectiveness of the self-regulatory 
entity, the Australian Press Council, in relation to the handling of 
complaints would necessarily translate into substantially increased 
control even if ostensibly that control were to be exercised for the greater 
good of society.  Furthermore, it is not unknown for publishers to be 
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critical of the Australian Press Council for allegedly exceeding its brief.  
In one recent manifestation of this malaise, a major publishing group 
abandoned its membership of the Council to establish its own regulatory 
entity.
7
  The group’s head, WA Newspapers group editor-in-chief said the 
Press Council had ‘drifted further and further from its original goal of 
promoting freedom of the press and the essential element of adjudicating 
complaints’ and of moving towards ‘a culture of control, coercion and 
punishment’.
8
  Another major publisher, News Limited, has expressed 
similar views.
9
  Notions of ‘independence’ and ‘effectiveness’, however, 
are value laden and, as will shortly be seen, raised questions in the 
particular context of the Minister’s remarks accompanying the inquiry’s 
launch.  Other indicators of the ‘control’ theme lay elsewhere in the terms 
of reference.  For example, the inquiry was to look into – the 
‘effectiveness of the current media codes of practice in Australia’;
10
 and 
the media’s ability ‘to operate according to regulations and codes of 
practice’.
11
  In his media remarks accompanying the announcement of the 
Finkelstein Inquiry, the Minister referred to ‘accountability’ in the media, 
to the need for accountability to be pursued through the Press Council, to 
ways of increasing the Press Council’s powers, and to the view held by 
some that the ‘Press Council is not doing its job’ to the extent that 
‘there’d be a lot of laughing’ in response to the question ‘what do you 
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think of the Press Council’.
12
  The Minister ‘congratulated’ the Press 
Council for recently having ‘higher findings in favour of complainants’.
13
  
The Minister also said: ‘The Press Council, for many, many years, has 
usually been seen as a fairly toothless tiger’.
14
  While the Minister refused 
to be drawn into explicitly supporting one side of the argument or the 
other, read in context, the Minister appeared to lean towards greater 
control over the media.  The Minister’s lauding of the ‘higher findings in 
favour of complainants’ assumes that the Press Council’s efficacy rested 
on the number of complaints it upheld.  In other words, the more 
complaints it upheld the more it would indicate the Press Council’s 
efficacy.  Such a position is flawed for the rule surely must be that the 
adjudicator must base its findings entirely on the merit of the complaint 
and not aim for any preconceived outcomes either favouring or rejecting 
complaints.  As such, it would be entirely conceivable that higher 
findings not favouring complainants should not deny the Press Council 
the right to be deemed as performing independently and effectively in 
relation to the handling of complaints.  Likewise, the Minister’s singling 
out of a particular offender (The Daily Telegraph) indicated a degree of 




If the professed media freedom and independence imperative seen above 
was taken into account the terms of reference would have had to include a 
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consideration of the state of media freedom in this country generally and 
whether any measures were warranted, for example, to address the 
concerns articulated by the media.  Such concerns are well catalogued, 
for instance, in the following works: (a) a report commissioned by the 
Australia’s Right to Know Coalition comprising major Australian media 
organisations;
16
 (b) and the annual Press Freedom Reports published by 
the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance.
17
  To illustrate the media’s 
concerns, the chair of the Independent Audit into the State of Media 
Freedom in Australia, Irene Moss, wrote as follows in a letter 
accompanying the report: 
The audit’s examination and resulting observations should ring 
alarm bells for those who value free speech in a democracy.  While 
Australia is generally accepted as a land of freedom and compares 
well internationally on many fronts on civil rights, this should not 
be taken for granted.  What the audit can observe is that many of the 
mechanisms that are so vital to a well-functioning democracy are 
beginning to wear thin.  Their functioning in many areas is flawed 
and not well maintained.
18
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The Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance in its Press Freedom Report 
in the year in which the Minister announced the Independent Media 
Inquiry noted as follows: 
More than a year after the Australian Law Reform Commission 
reported on more than 500 separate pieces of legislation containing 
secrecy clauses, its recommendations have yet to be followed.  This 
must be addressed, as a matter of urgency.
19
 
Other factors similarly contributed to the eventual collapse of the 
regulation reform enterprise primarily because of doubts as to the 
inquiry’s very legitimacy.  Two such factors may be briefly disposed of 
here.  One was the apparent nexus between what has been widely 
described as the ‘phone hacking scandal’ in the United Kingdom.  
Another was the influence on the debate from the Australian Greens.  The 
inquiry’s proximity to inquiries in the United Kingdom arising from the 
‘phone hacking scandal’ prompted a perception that those events were the 
catalyst for this inquiry even though nothing in the conduct of Australian 
journalists suggested that such an inquiry was warranted in Australia.  
The Federal Secretary of the Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance 
Chris Warren noted: 
The News of the World phone-hacking scandal was the catalyst for 
this inquiry – perhaps a little unfairly as there is no evidence that 
Australian journalists are slipshod or devious when it comes to 
journalistic ethics.  Apart from a handful of cases, Australian 
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The Prime Minister Julia Gillard initially expressed the view that News 
Limited, the Australian publishing arm of media proprietor Rupert 
Murdoch’s Australian newspapers, had ‘some hard questions’ to answer 
over its Australian operations.
21
  The Prime Minister later retreated from 
that position.
22
  Indeed, the Independent Media Inquiry report would 
subsequently note that it was ‘not suggested that News Limited, the 
Australian subsidiary of News Corporation, had engaged in similar 
practices’ as its UK counterpart News of the World.  Such has been the 
magnitude of the UK events that several arrests have been made and 
senior media executives have been charged in court.
23
  The then 
Australian Greens leader and senator, Bob Brown, also featured 
prominently in the debate, if not altogether becoming a key influence.  
Mr Brown, writing in 2012, claimed credit for prompting the Australian 
inquiry: ‘After a campaign from the Australian Greens, on 14 September 
2011 the Australian Government established an independent inquiry into 
                                           
20
  See Chris Warren, ‘How Do You Solve a Problem Like the Media’ (2012) 
69 Walkley Magazine 14. 
21
  Ben Packham, ‘Julia Gillard Says News Ltd Has Questions to Answer in 




  Matthew Franklin, ‘Julia Gillard Backs News Ltd Action on Phone-Hacking 




  Lisa O’Carroll, ‘Andy Coulson Pleads Not Guilty To Phone-Hacking 
Charges’, The Guardian (online), 6 June 2013 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
uk/2013/jun/06/andy-coulson-pleads-not-guilty-phone-hacking>.  Former News 
International chief executive Rebekah Brooks has also been charged with offences 
relating to her time in the publisher’s service.  As to arrests see: Adam Sherwin, ‘Six 
Former News of the World Journalists Arrested in Hacking Inquiry’, The Independent 
(online), 13 February 2013 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/six-
former-news-of-the-world-journalists-arrested-in-hacking-inquiry-8492757.html>. 





  He recommended that a new body, a News 
Media Council, be established ‘to set journalistic standards for the news 
media in consultation with the industry, and handle complaints made by 
the public when those standards are breached.’
25
  Mr Brown’s interest in 
the matter was influenced by his own experiences in relation to some 
sections of the Australian media.  He singled out the Murdoch media, 
whom he accused of not being balanced and of ‘doing a great disservice 
to this nation in perhaps the most important debate of the century so far, 
which is how we tackle climate change’.
26
  In the course of those remarks 
he described the Murdoch press as the ‘hate media’.
27
  Those remarks 
have been described as an ‘ad hominem attack on the Murdoch press’.
28
  
The Greens deputy leader Christine Milne expressed similarly critical 
views about the Murdoch press, accusing it of ‘extreme’ bias in relation 
to the climate change debate in The Australian newspaper, in particular, 
and spoke of the relevance of the nexus between the UK phone hacking 
scandal and a ‘truly overdue’ inquiry into the media in Australia.
29
  The 
origins of the Independent Media Inquiry therefore lay on loose 
foundations and it was on course to encounter strong resistance.  As 
bluntly stated by the head of the news establishment that bore the brunt of 
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the Greens criticism: ‘The inquiry started life as a witch-hunt by the 
Greens and has morphed into a fairly narrow look at a mixed bag of 
issues ostensibly focused on print journalism.’
30
  Mr Ray Finkelstein, in 
his report, set out the origins of inquiry by referring to: (a) the UK phone-
hacking scandal that prompted the Leveson Inquiry; (b) the calls in 
Australia for a similar inquiry, including calls by the leader of the 
Australian Greens for an inquiry (to canvass, among other things: 
whether publishers should be licensed; and whether a ‘fit and proper 
person’ test should be applied for media ownership); and concerns 
expressed by ‘several politicians and others’ that certain sections of News 
Limited’s newspapers were biased in their reporting on issues such as 
climate change and the National Broadband Network.
31
  While the 
heading under which Mr Finkelstein set out these factors was ‘Origins of 
the inquiry’, the manner in which he set out these factors did not 
expressly state that these factors in fact constituted the inquiry’s origins.  
On a strict interpretation, these ‘origins’ were not really origins, per se, 
but random factors that preceded the establishment of the inquiry.  It is 
safe to conclude, however, that despite the absence of express attribution 
of the inquiry’s establishment to these factors, these factors were in fact 
key causal elements.  The apparent nexus between the UK phone-hacking 
scandal and the Australian inquiry is an extremely tenuous one given the 
gaping chasm between the circumstances in the two jurisdictions.  The 
conditions in Australia were far removed from those that gave rise to the 
UK inquiries.  Keeble and Mair sum up the UK circumstance aptly: 
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The scale of outrages practised on significant numbers of citizens 
include, above all else, wanton invasions of privacy through phone 
hacking, deceit, disguise and sometimes robbery; the giving over of 
most space in the most popular newspapers to the trivial, ignoring 
that which is significant in the world; the construction of wholly or 
partly fictional narratives; the at least implicit blackmailing of 
politicians with threats of exposure if they prove ‘unhelpful’.  All of 
this has been contained within an attitude which assumed immunity 
from legal or other challenge, because of the immense power which 
mass readerships was assumed to bring.
32
 
On the above premise – that the UK events could not have served to 
justify an Australian inquiry – the ensuing steps towards an inquiry in 
Australia, while exuding an attempt to conduct an inquiry grounded in 
well-conceived objectives and forensic methods of inquiry were tainted 
even before it began.  This can be illustrated by a close look at one aspect 
of the inquiry – its mode of conduct in so far as submissions is concerned 
– and that is considered next. 
III CONDUCT OF THE INQUIRY 
In examining an aspect of the mode of the inquiry’s conduct, one 
preliminary matter bears addressing.  Mr Finkelstein in his report set out 
the mode of the inquiry’s conduct after observing that the terms of 
reference were ‘not as broad as had been called for’.
33
  He identified two 
examples of matters he would have liked covered but could not address.  
‘For example’, it was not within his remit to investigate whether there 
should be restrictions on foreign ownership of the press, nor was he 
required to investigate whether there should be changes to the law 
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relating to press ownership.
34
  This raises the question – if these were just 
two examples of terms of reference that were not as broad as had been 
called for, what else might he have considered appropriate to investigate 
but was unable to?  In setting out to tap input into the inquiry Mr 
Finkelstein contacted many publishers, editors, academics and others 
inviting them to make submissions and in some instances sought 
information on specific topics and he also conducted public hearings.
35
  
One aspect of the feedback gathering, however, merits scrutiny because it 
gave the exercise an aura of extensive public consultation.  The report, as 
will be seen below, referred to a substantial body of previous polling 
showing adverse public perceptions of media standards and performance, 
covering about 45 years.  The inquiry’s own feedback gathering, 
however, raises questions.  The report states that submissions were 
received from some 11,000 persons and organisations.  Of this, 10,600 
were short submissions (500 words or less) and of the total number of 
submissions, about 9600 were facilitated through an advocacy group, 
Avaaz.
36
  These submissions used a text prepared by Avaaz, which 
describes itself as ‘the campaigning community bringing people-powered 
politics to decision-making worldwide’.
37
  The text’s phrasing included 
the following words: 
In your findings, I urge you to demand a limit on media 
concentration and an adequately funded public interest media in 
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The demands for a limit on media concentration and for the introduction 
of a ‘fit and proper person test’, however, fell outside the inquiry’s terms 
of reference and to that extent the value of that feedback was undermined.  
As the Finkelstein Report itself noted ‘[r]elatively few submissions 
explicitly addressed a number of issues specifically identified in the 
inquiry’s terms of reference’.
39
  Only 25 of the submissions dealt with the 
industry’s codes of conduct; the effectiveness and independence of the 
Australian Press Council (34 submissions); and the impact on the 
industry of the emergence of online media (five submissions).  Of the 447 
submissions that explicitly called for action to strengthen the regulatory 
regime or enforcement arrangements, only 65 submissions provided 
detailed options for improvement of self-regulatory arrangements, of 
which only 34 explicitly identified the Australian Press Council (the 
country’s main grouping representing newspaper publishers).  By 
engaging in an exercise that harnessed advocacy – at best advocacy of a 
robust kind and at worst of a crude kind – the Finkelstein Inquiry in effect 
engaged in the very practices some of the agitators for the inquiry had 
indicted the media of, including that of imbalance and of biased self-
advocacy.
40
  To be sure, the Finkelstein Inquiry itself affirmed that ‘there 
is nothing wrong with newspapers having an opinion and advocating a 
position, even mounting a campaign.  Those are the natural and generally 
expected functions of newspapers.’
41
 
IV WAS THERE A PROBLEM AND WHAT WAS IT? 
A rudimentary component of any reform initiative lies in identifying the 
problem needing to be addressed.  Given the apparent influence of the 
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Australian Greens, as seen above, on the establishment of the inquiry, it is 
worth keeping in view the Greens’ definition of the problem.  This may 
be seen in then Senator Bob Brown’s submission to the inquiry.  That 
submission does not conveniently or clearly set out its definition of the 
issues or problems underpinning the inquiry.  The following list of issues, 
however, may be teased out from the submission: (a) the journalism 
profession’s ethics are, in important aspects, undermined; (b) the public 
esteem for the news media is depressed; (c) the concentration of 
ownership is corrosive of the fabric of Australian democracy; (d) current 
cross-media rules have limited scope and do not apply to a range of 
platforms; and (e) the media is owned by the wealthy and media 
proprietors are often involved in other business activities which may 
expose them to conflicts of interest with their media outlets.
42
  Of these, 
only the first two items can be viewed as addressing the inquiry’s terms 
of reference.  Importantly, save random references to alleged media 
lapses, the submission does not provide clear evidence supported by 
cogent argument for the claim that the profession’s ethics are in important 
aspects undermined. 
In examining the inquiry proper, the starting point would be to locate its 
definition of the issues or problems deserving attention.  This is the 
function usually served by an Issues Paper.  Mr Finkelstein released the 
Issues Paper on 28 September 2011 identifying the ‘principal issues that 
would be considered’.
43
  The scope of the Issues Paper was, in turn, 
purportedly determined by distilling from the terms of reference released 
earlier (21 September 2011).  In other words, the scope of the Issues 
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Paper was confined to the terms of reference announced by the Minister.  
On this point, Mr Finkelstein states in his report:  
After considering the terms of reference I thought it appropriate to 
distil from them and explain what would be some of the principal 
issues that would be considered.  To that end I prepared and on 28 
September 2011 published an Issues Paper in which those issues 
were set out.  The Issues Paper was not intended to be a 
comprehensive list of the topics to be dealt with, but it contained 
some of the most important.
44
 
Two important points can be made about the references above to the 
‘issues’.  First, strictly speaking, the terms of reference announced by the 
Minister did not expressly identify any issues or problems.  Rather, they 
identified the matters that the inquiry should address.  It is worth restating 
the terms limb by limb: (a) the effectiveness of the current media codes of 
practice in Australia; (b) the effectiveness of the codes particularly in 
light of technological change leading to the migration of print media to 
digital and online platforms; (c) the impact of technological change on 
the media’s business model; (d) the independence and effectiveness of 
the Australian Press Council in relation to online publications and in 
relation to the handling of complaints; and (e) any related issues 
pertaining to the media’s ability to operate according to regulations and 
codes of practice, and in the public interest.  None of these terms 
explicitly identified a problem or issue.  They merely identified matters 
that would be examined through the inquiry.  The second important point 
concerns the very purpose of an Issues Paper.  The purpose of an Issues 
Paper can be viewed as a means of providing ‘a preliminary look at issues 
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  As such, the Finkelstein Issues Paper ought to 
have identified the issue or the problem it was addressing.  It failed to do 
this.  This is what Mr Finkelstein claimed his Issues Paper was designed 
to do and set out his Issues Paper objective as follows: 
In the course of considering the matters raised in the terms of 
reference, it will be necessary for the Media Inquiry to consider, 
among other matters, the issues listed below.  The list of issues is 
not set out in any order of importance.  Nor is the list intended to be 
comprehensive.  The issues are, however, among the most important 
matters that the inquiry will consider.  The Media Inquiry will be 
greatly assisted by any comments it will receive.  It is not necessary 
for a respondent to deal with each and every issue.  The Media 
Inquiry would in any event be assisted if persons choose to 
comment only on specific issues.
46
 
Leaving aside the slippage in the above description between ‘matters’ and 
‘issues’ (the former, not necessarily indicative of problems, per se even 
when read with the terms of reference) this passage clearly evinces an 
intention to address issues or problems.  What followed in the next seven 
pages of the Issues Paper, however, almost entirely comprised questions 
under various headings: access; standards; regulation; new media and 
business models; and support.  For example, under the ‘access’ heading, 
after a statement referring to Justice Holmes judgment in Abrams v 
United States, 250 US 616, 624 (1919) concerning the famous 
‘marketplace of ideas theory’, the Issues Paper poses five questions, 
including the following: whether this ‘marketplace of ideas’ theory 
assumes that the market is open and readily accessible; and whether there 
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are alternative or preferable justifications for freedom of the media.
47
  No 
issues, as such, were expressly identified.  Instead, the Issues Paper 
presented questions and hypotheticals (for example, ‘[i]f self-regulation is 
not an effective means of regulation, what alternative models of 
regulation could be adopted that would appropriately maintain freedom of 
the media?’).
48
  Notably, the Issues Paper contained no reference to 
‘bias’, ‘imbalance’, ‘privacy’ or any of the potpourri of complaints 
preceding the establishment of the inquiry.  This is not to say that there 
were no ‘issues’ whatsoever requiring attention, or that there was a dearth 
of places in which to look to find those ‘issues’.  Aside from the points 
canvassed above in relation to ‘origins of the inquiry’ some indication of 
the alleged issue or problem could be found, for instance, from the 
Minister’s remarks when announcing the inquiry or from those identified 
by Mr Bob Brown (discussed above).  For the sake of completeness and 
tidiness, however, an exercise as far reaching as this one ought to have 
clearly enunciated the issues or problems at hand, at the very outset and 
systematically pursued them through the inquiry and reporting phases.  A 
recent and related approach to an Issues Paper that sets out the problem 
being addressed is evident in the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority’s Issues Paper published ahead of a proposed far-reaching 
inquiry.  In that Issues Paper the ACMA identifies the problem at hand as 
being that many of the traditional legislative mechanisms ‘now struggle 
to respond to’ technological developments and the merging of previously 
distinct platforms, and it refers to two further ‘particularly informative’ 
works that discuss the problem.
49
  In the Finkelstein Issues Paper, far 
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from explicitly identifying the problem being addressed, the Issues Paper 
raised far-reaching and ambiguous questions inevitably resulting in the 
misdirected responses the inquiry received, consequently afflicting the 
Inquiry Report itself, as the following discussion illustrates. 
In approaching the examination of the report’s failure to properly identify 
the issues or problems warranting reform of media regulation, it is 
appropriate to focus on the relevant discussion in the Finkelstein Report.  
The report, covering more than 400 pages, is structured under 12 
headings.  They are, respectively: introduction; the democratic 
indispensability of a free press; newspaper industry structure and 
performance; media standards; the legal position of the media – 
privileges of the media, and restrictions on speech; the regulation of 
broadcasting; self-regulation – journalistic codes and ombudsmen; self-
regulation and the press council; rights of reply, correction, and apology; 
theories of regulation; reform; and changing business models and 
government support (emphasis added).  These headings are instructive in 
locating the report’s identification of the problem the inquiry was 
ostensibly addressing.  Two of the headings are of particular relevance in 
the present discussion because they contain some indication of ‘the 
problem’, or alleged problem.  Under the media standards heading the 
report said the purpose of the section was to test the validity of ‘the 
different assertions’.
50
  These assertions, on the one hand, were the 
media’s claim that the present accountability mechanisms were sufficient, 
that there was no problem with the integrity, accuracy, bias or conduct of 
the media that warrant further regulation, and that there is no evidence 
that journalists were routinely inaccurate and biased or lacked integrity or 
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that they ignored accepted press principles.
51
  The Finkelstein Report, for 
its part, did observe that there ‘is much to celebrate about the Australian 
news media’ and the report said it was ‘also clear from the evidence 
given by the editors and journalists who appeared before the inquiry that 
major Australian newspapers are staffed by people committed to their 
craft’ and that ‘[i]n many respects they serve the community well’.
52
  On 
this count then it may be said that there was no serious problem and 
therefore no strong justification for regulatory review or intervention.  On 
the other hand, the report stated that there are matters of concern.  The 
report relied on ‘a substantial body of evidence from public opinion polls 
about the public’s perception of media standards and performance’ 
covering 45 years from 1966, comprised in 21 surveys leaving to the 
conclusion that ‘the findings indicate significant concerns in the minds of 
the public over media performance’.
53
  The report identified these 
concerns about the media as: (a) trust; (b) performance; (c) bias; (d) 
influence/power; and (e) ethics and intrusions on privacy.
54
  While 
describing the data from the public opinion polls as ‘evidence’ the report 
itself expressed reservations about ‘the quality – and therefore the 
usefulness – of public opinion polling’.
55
  It said:  
[P]ublic opinion polling is dependent upon a number of factors, 
including the reliability, validity and fairness of the questions; the 
size and representativeness of the sample, and the soundness of 
judgment about whether people know enough about the topic to 
have a genuine opinion on it.
56
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As the report itself said the public opinion polls were based on 
perceptions.  As such, it is questionable whether such public opinion polls 
can properly be characterised as ‘evidence’.  The term ‘evidence’ for 
legal purposes has been defined as consisting of the ‘testimony, hearsay, 
documents, things and facts which a court will accept as evidence of the 
facts in issue in a given case’.
57
  On this definition of ‘evidence’, while 
hearsay constitutes one of the factors that may be taken into account, the 
factual imperative cannot be divorced from a consideration of ‘evidence’ 
– in fact, the factual imperative is prominent.  Even conceding that the 
public opinion polls provided ‘some clear trends of public opinion’, as 
the report claimed, viewed against the competing evidence that the report 
attributed above to editors and journalists the answer to the question ‘is 
there a problem?’ must be that the answer to the question is inconclusive 
and therefore unsafe as a foundation for justifying legislative intervention 
of the scale proposed in the exercise that was afoot.  The Finkelstein 
Report’s discussion of the five concerns about the media (items (a) to (e) 
above) is grounded in what the various surveys of public perception 
showed, and not in evidence of specific instances or data pertaining to 
media breaches in respect of these five topics.  For present purposes it 
suffices to turn to another relevant discussion of ‘the problem’ in the 
report.  And this is done next. 
Under the chapter entitled ‘Reform’ the report provides a discussion 
under the section entitled ‘Is there a problem?’.  While the report appears 
to identify only two problems, going by its references to the ‘first 
problem’ and ‘second problem’, a longer list of ‘problems’ may be 
extrapolated from the section: (a) market failure;
58
 (b) the general distrust 
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 (c) strong evidence of problems with the reporting of 
political issues;
60
 (d) transgressions of the fundamental principles of 
fairness, accuracy and balance (examples cited included bias in the 
reporting of government affairs, obsessive attempts to influence 
government policy, commercially-driven opposition to government 
policy, and the unfair pursuit of individuals based on inaccurate 
information);
61
 (e) the wrongful harm that the media ‘can cause’; 
62
 (f) the 
failure of self-regulation ‘in dealing with irresponsible reporting’;
63
 
(g) problems associated with online publications including its 
‘unmanaged and uncontrolled’ nature and inconsistency in applicable 
standards; 
64
 and (h) problems associated with the regulation of the 
broadcast news and current affairs sector.
65
  That said, however, the 
chapter is afflicted by a lack of clarity in the identification of the alleged 
problems the inquiry was seeking to address.  Curiously, the report 
accepted the ninemsn submission view that ‘there is no significant 
research that conclusively links drops in readership to specific issues of 
quality’.
66
  Curiously also, while acknowledging the codes of ethics have 
improved the position in respect of ‘irresponsible reporting’ (that term 
warrants deeper discussion but such a task is beyond the scope of this 
work), the report observes that the difficulties faced by an entity such as 
the Press Council ‘are problems that such bodies face in many 
democracies’.
67
  This indicates clearly that problem the inquiry was 
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seeking to resolve was far from unique let alone one that offered easily 
attainable goals. 
The report is also replete with assertions and unwieldy concerns.  For 
example, the report observed that ‘the general reader is seldom in a 
position to know whether the information provided in a story is accurate, 
whether the sources quoted are reliable, and whether all the relevant facts 
have been interpreted objectively’.
68
  Offering a solution to these 
dilemmas would no doubt bring great relief to society but must remain a 
pipe dream for reasons that are too obvious to rehearse here.  Suffice to 
say that it would be totally unfair to lay the blame for this malaise 
squarely at the media’s feet.  The report further asserted that while the 
Senate Select Committee on Information Technologies recognised 
problems with media regulation as long ago as April 2000, there has been 
‘little improvement in the past 12 years’.
69
  If such a claim as to the extent 
of ‘improvement’ was capable of empirical testing, it was not done in the 
Finkelstein Report.  The report also singled out five ‘striking instances’ 
of media lapses in support of its claim as to the existence of a problem, 
that is, the following five examples constituted ‘striking instances’ of 
how the news media ‘can cause wrongful harm’ through unreliable or 
inaccurate reporting, breach of privacy, and the failure to properly take 
into account the defenceless in the community.
70
  A closer look at these 
five ‘striking instances’ is appropriate as it further illustrates the weak 
premises upon which the report erected its case for strong regulatory 
intervention. 
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The first alleged ‘striking instance’ cited was that of a minister of the 
Crown being forced to resign after the media exposed his 
homosexuality.
71
  That case, however, was disposed of by the Australian 
Media and Communications Authority, which found in favour of 
publication of the material on the grounds of ‘an identifiable public 
interest’.
72
  Without going into detail about the wisdom of that decision, 
the point that needs emphasising is that the complaint in question was 
processed through an existing complaints mechanism and no argument 
was advanced as to the adequacy or otherwise of that complaints process.  
The second alleged ‘striking instance’ referred to the forced resignation 
of a ministerial adviser following false accusations about the job 
performance of a chief commissioner of police.
73
  The report fails to 
explain why this constituted a ‘striking instance’ of media malfeasance or 
why the victim was unable to obtain redress through conventional redress 
mechanisms if such redress was merited.  The third alleged ‘striking 
instance’ referred to a person being wrongly implicated in the deaths of 
her two young children in a house fire and media coverage in her moment 
of grief.
74
  The report fails to set out whether the victim invoked any 
existing complaints device and what the outcome, if any, was or even if 
the fault lay with the media.  Such a false allegation would have been an 
open and shut case in which liability would be found if the transgressors 
did not make amends.  The fourth alleged ‘striking instance’ referred to 
the publication of nude photographs falsely said to be of a female 
politician.
75
  While the Finkelstein Report did not identify the politician 
concerned it presumably referred to the publication of purportedly nude 
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pictures of former One Nation leader Pauline Hanson.  In that case, 
however, the offending publisher conceded the error and apologised to 
Ms Hanson and reportedly arrived at a settlement with her.
76
  As such, the 
available and established redress mechanisms performed satisfactorily in 
this instance.  The fifth alleged ‘striking instance’ of the media’s lapse 
was identified as the victimisation of a teenage girl because she had 
sexual relations with a well-known sportsman.  The Finkelstein Report 
did not provide details but this presumably refers to the saga of the girl 
otherwise referred to as the ‘St Kilda Girl’.  While the facts concerning 
this matter are not entirely clear and while there are suggestions that the 
girl herself was complicit in the publication of private material eventually 
some media outlets took a stand and announced that they would ‘back 
off’.
77
  The failure here, if any, can also be attributed to the absence of 
clarity in the country’s privacy law – an issue that Australia’s legislatures 
have long grappled with and failed to properly address.  The most recent 
initiative in this direction was shelved, according to the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus, because ‘there was little consensus even 
amongst privacy advocates on how this legal right should be created’.
78
  
That aside, it is far from clear that the Australian media are inveterate 
privacy violators going, for instance, on complaints made to the 
Australian Press Council.  In the 22 years to 2010, the Council received a 
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total of 469 complaints for invasion of privacy, out of a total of 8916 
complaints during that period, amounting to just over five per cent of the 
total complaints.
79
  No breakdown is available specifically for the 
outcome of the privacy intrusion complaints.  The general rate of 
complaints fully or partly upheld on adjudication by the Press Council for 
that period was just over eight per cent.  If this ratio was applied to the 
statistic above for total complaints received, it would appear that over the 
22-year period only 40 complaints to the Press Council for privacy 
intrusion were fully or partly upheld on adjudication.  This is by no 
means intended to suggest that privacy intrusion by the media is not a 
matter of concern.  Rather, it is meant to suggest that, on paper at least, 
more was needed to substantiate the Finkelstein Report’s claim that 
breach of privacy was a matter of serious concern warranting the 
measures that were being recommended. 
Each of the above five cited ‘striking instances’ were either disposed of 
through existing redress mechanisms or could easily have been addressed 
through these mechanisms.  The Finkelstein Report does not explain why 
existing redress mechanism failed to assist the victims in these 
circumstances, for example, through the law of defamation or through 
complaints for breach of professional codes of practice. 
V THE FINKELSTEIN INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The recommendation of foremost significance to the news media 
emerging from the Independent Media Inquiry was the establishment of a 
‘News Media Council’ (‘NMC’), loosely referred to as a ‘super 
regulator’, to oversee the enforcement of standards of the news media and 
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that this body would take over the functions of the Australian Press 
Council and the current affairs standards of the Australian 
Communications and Media Authority.
80
  The NMC was to be free from 
the influence of the executive branch of government and a committee 
independent of government would appoint NMC members.
81
  The NMC 
would develop standards of conduct to govern the news media – non-
binding aspirational principles and detailed standards – similar to the 
standards of the two peak press entities, the Media, Entertainment and 
Arts Alliance and the Press Council.  A detailed critique of the 
recommendations is not possible in the present work given the breadth of 
the report and the extent of its reach covering the rationale for the 
establishment of a new regulatory entity, its composition, the manner of 
its appointment, the processes for handling complaints, the remedial 
powers, enforcement, appeals, cost of implementation and its purported 
benefits.
82
  A few observations might, however, be made.  One concerns 
the ‘independence imperative’ and the related question of the proposed 
NMC’s composition.  The inquiry clearly acknowledged that any reform 
of media regulation would be unsatisfactory if the regulatory mechanism 
was not underpinned by independence, especially from the executive 
branch of government.
83
  That led the inquiry to recommend an elaborate 
council composition framework that, notwithstanding the inquiry’s good 
intentions, was fertile for challenge.  Among its features was the proposal 
to set up a body to appoint the NMC, such a body perhaps comprising 
three senior academics from tertiary institutions; the NMC itself would 
consist of a full-time independent chair and 20 part-time members – one 
half of them selected from the public at large, the other half appointed 
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from the media but excluding media managers, directors and shareholders 
and whose candidates are nominated by the MEAA and the media, and 
one half comprising men and the other half women.
84
  While these 
appointment devices bore the hallmarks of an independent appointment 
process and leading to an ostensibly balanced composition of the bodies 
entrusted with regulatory power, it would hardly escape questioning, for 
example, as to why senior academics should be given the role of 
appointing the NMC members or how these senior academics themselves 
would be selected given that deep divisions emerged within even the 
academic fraternity as to what shape regulatory reform should take.
85
  It 
is also pertinent to query the Finkelstein Inquiry proposal to devote half 
the make-up of the News Media Council to media representatives given, 
as noted above, the weight the inquiry gave to the low public perception 
of the media reflected in public opinion surveys over a 45-year period.  
Likewise, questions could be asked as to what material improvement 
could result from the recommended reform if the setting of standards was 
carried out by an entity whose very constitution was vulnerable to 
scepticism.  Furthermore, why should the same minimum standards of 
fairness and accuracy not have to apply across delivery platforms, so that 
some aspects were treated as platform specific, as recommended by the 
inquiry? 
While the setting of standards should be left to the News Media 
Council, they should incorporate certain minimum standards, such 
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as fairness and accuracy.  The same standards need not apply across 




One particularly objectionable aspect of the inquiry’s recommendations 
was its proscription of any freedom of speech obligation on the NMC’s 
part, contrary to the dictates of any prudent approach towards media 
regulation.  The inquiry stated: 
The News Media Council requires clearly defined functions.  It is 
not recommended that one of them be the promotion of free speech.  
There are ample bodies and persons in the community who do that 
more than adequately.  The principal function of the News Media 




The recommendation directly contradicted any profession of a 
commitment to ‘a healthy and robust media’ and to an ‘independent 
media that is able to fulfil its essential democratic purpose’ as seen above 
in the Minister’s position during the launch of the inquiry and it went 
against established values and principles cherished by any democratic 
society.  In sharp contrast, in the United Kingdom, where the subject of 
media regulation reform has been aggressively canvassed in the wake of 
the phone hacking scandal and the ensuing Leveson Inquiry, sight has not 
been lost of the need to entrench free speech protections into any 
regulatory scheme.  The draft royal charter on regulation, for instance, 
while allowing for provisions that would check against media excesses, 
incorporated support for the ‘freedom of the press’
88
 and for any code to 
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‘take into account the importance of freedom of speech’.
89
  Likewise the 
draft Bill proposed by the advocacy group that campaigned for a public 
inquiry into the phone hacking scandal, Hacked Off, in its draft Bill 
prompted by the Leveson Inquiry recommendations, proposed in its very 
first clause that there be a guarantee of media freedom.
90
  The Bill’s 
preamble described it as a Bill ‘to protect the freedom and independence 
of the media and to provide for the process and effect of recognition of 
voluntary media regulators.’
91
  The group noted that the Bill ‘[e]shrines 
the freedom of the press in statute for the first time, making attempted 
ministerial or other state inference in the media explicitly illegal’.
92
  The 
Finkelstein Inquiry recommendations pertaining to the proposed media 
policing entity, the News Media Council, were devoid of any such 
commitment to freedom of speech and, as noted above, deemed this ideal 
a peripheral concern best left to the unidentified ‘ample bodies and 
persons in the community who do that more than adequately’.
93
 
VI THE COLLAPSE OF THE REFORM INITIATIVE 
Almost thirteen months after the Finkelstein Report was released and 
after a period of relative hibernation on the report’s recommendations, the 
Commonwealth Government unveiled the legislative reform package.  As 
reported by ABC Television’s Lateline program, the government told 
MPs they had eight days to decide whether to support ‘the new raft of 
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media reforms, a take-it-or-leave-it-ultimatum’.
94
  There was no 
mistaking the Minister’s position: 
[O]ur position is – and I’m going to be very clear about this – this 
package is not up for bartering and negotiation and things to be 
added on here or things to be added on there and deals and cross 
deals.  This is – everybody’s known for two years this debate’s 
coming, everyone’s known what the Convergence Review have 
pushed, what the Finkelstein Report recommended, all of those 
things have been taken in as a consideration.  We’re not going to be 
dragged around for months on this.  This is a package that the 
Parliament fully understands and the Parliament will be in a position 
to make a judgment next week.
95
 
Upon being pressed by the Lateline presenter Emma Alberici as to the 
reason for the ‘deadline of next week?  Why rush it through?’ the 
Minister responded (using the terms ‘this package’ and ‘a bill’ in the 
same interview) that the proposed legislation had been many years in the 
making, that every political party had debated it and that in essence the 
proposed legislation was no ‘surprise to anybody’.
96
  The Minister added, 
in response to the presenter’s question, as to what the outcome would be 
if no agreement were reached by the deadline: 
We won’t be proceeding with it.  That is absolutely the position.  
We are not going to proceed with this, we’re not going to spend 
months and months being dragged around, negotiating this little bit 
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In the event, the package referred to six Bills comprising measures 
representing the Government’s response to the Convergence Review and 
the Finkelstein Inquiry.
98
  Of the six Bills, two were passed and the 
remaining four discharged from the Notice Paper, that is, these four were 
abandoned.
99
  Of these four the most controversial, and the key plank of 
the whole exercise, was the Public Interest Media Advocate Bill 2013 
(‘PIMA Bill’), which was aimed at creating a new independent statutory 
office to perform functions under the News Media (Self-Regulation) Bill 
2013.  The PIMA Bill was also aimed at overseeing the ‘public interest 
test’ that was to be established in the new part 5A of the Broadcasting 
Services Act 1992.
100
  According to the Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum 
the Public Interest Media Advocate would be appointed by the Minister 
but, to protect the independence and impartiality of the role, would not be 
subject to the Minister’s or the Government’s direction in relation to the 
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News Media (Self-Regulation) Bill 2013 – among other things to allow the Public 
Interest Media Advocate to declare a specified body corporate as a news media self-
regulation body (discharged); News Media (Self-regulation) (Consequential 
Amendments) Bill 2013 – to provide that a news media organisation must be a 
member of the news media self-regulation body to qualify for the journalism 
exemption relating to the obtaining, keeping and disclosing of personal information 
(discharged); Public Interest Media Advocate Bill 2013 – providing for the creation of 
the independent statutory office of the Public Interest Media Advocate, and providing 
for the functions, appointment and terms and conditions of the PIMA (discharged). 
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performance of its functions or the exercise of its powers.  Furthermore, 
this measure would assist to safeguard the PIMA’s role and enable it to 
operate at arm’s length from the Government.  This attempt at legislative 
measures to regulate the media went directly against the Convergence 
Review approach which ‘provide[d] for direct statutory mechanisms to be 
considered only after the industry has been given the full opportunity to 
develop and enforce an effective, cross-platform self-regulatory 
scheme’.
101
  The Convergence Review report identified this approach as 
one of the ‘key areas’ in which it differed from the Finkelstein Inquiry.  
The Convergence Review report noted further that, as part of its initial 
deliberations, the review established a set of ten principles to guide its 
work and the ‘first and most fundamental principle’ was that ‘[c]itizens 
and organisations should be able to communicate freely and, where 
regulation is required, it should be the minimum necessary to achieve a 
clear public purpose’.
102
  Yet, the Government, without any explanation 
as to why it ignored this recommendation by another of its own inquiries, 
proceeded to introduce the above raft of Bills.  It did so with undue haste 
couched in the language of deadlines and ultimatums and amid 
widespread concern that the Bills, in particular, the PIMA Bill was 
lacking in fundamental detail.  The Opposition Communications 
spokesperson Malcolm Turnbull said in Parliament the Government was 
moving on the PIMA Bill in a manner that was ‘turning this Parliament 
into a farce’ by ‘currently doing a dirty deal with various of the 
Independents to change the nature of the Public Interest Media 
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  As the deadline for a consensus on the Bills’ passage 
loomed a last-minute rush unfolded when it appeared that crucial support 
for the Bills was wavering.  It transpired that, contrary to earlier 
expectations the Bills were not going to be considered together.  As Mr 
Turnbull saw it, the Bills were originally going to be debated in ‘a 
cognate way, because they all link together’ but ‘now we have learned, 
just in the last few minutes, of a dramatic change’ that would leave the 
PIMA Bill to be debated at the very end as the last Bill on the program 
because the Minister was ‘still negotiating its contents’.
104
  The attendant 
parliamentary chaos is reflected in the following remarks: 
[W]e do not know what the PIMA is going to be, because the PIMA 
is defined as the Public Interest Media Advocate as established in 
the Public Interest Media Advocate Act 2013.  Well, the Public 
Interest Media Advocate Bill 2013, which is the foundation of this 
whole exercise, is a work in progress… [E]very time you think the 
government have plumbed the depths of absurdity and 
dysfunctionality, they find a new depth to which they can sink, and 
that is what they are doing tonight.  Now what are we debating?  
What is this Public Interest Media Advocate?  Who is it?  Who is 
she?  Are there three?  Are there five?  Are they appointed for life?  
Do they have to be residents of a particular electorate?  Are they 
appointed for three years or four years?  What are their 
qualifications?  We have no idea.  And we have no idea because the 
government have no idea.
105
 
On the morning of 20 March 2013, as the events were unfolding the ABC 
News 24 channel was announcing ‘Federal Government sources say 
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remaining media law bills dead’.  This was confirmed as true shortly 
afterwards. 
VII CONCLUSION 
The reform exercises through the Convergence Review and the 
Finkelstein Inquiry, as noted above, were not the first such efforts at 
media regulation reform.  The last major exercise culminating in a Senate 
Committee report 13 years ago, in key respects, reached somewhat 
similar conclusions.  In particular, that Committee found ‘substantial 
evidence to question the efficacy of self-regulation and co-regulation in 
Australia’s information and communications industries’.
106
  That 
Committee therefore recommended that the Government establish a 
Media Complaints Commission ‘to oversee various existing bodies and 
processes which currently regulate these industries’.
107
  A legitimate 
conversation on media regulation remains justified at the present time.  
Such a conversation is one that not even the media itself is averse to.  As 
the peak media body representing journalists observed: 
[I]t is a welcome opportunity for us to take stock of self-regulation 
and ask how it might be enhanced.  We should consider if there is a 
need to reform the Australian Press Council or if there is anything 
the government might do to support the health of the news industry 




The Alliance described the reform package as ‘a missed opportunity’ to 
recognised the real problems confronting the Australian media; to ensure 
the future health of Australian journalism; and that it failed to address the 
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urgent need for investment incentives, digital training and support for 
alternate voices in the media landscape.
109
  The above reform initiative, 
as the above discussion has demonstrated, was ill-conceived, its data-
gathering effort was flawed, the recommendations were not fully 
grounded in reason, and the final attempt at execution through the 
legislative package was driven by unseemly haste and riven with 
confusion and ambiguity.  The exercise was – put simply – a debacle.  An 
elaborate exercise in media regulation reform came to an abrupt and 
ignominious end.  That it did so was hardly surprising given the events 
and the manner in which the proponents of media regulation prosecuted 
their objectives.  As this author noted at the outset, the Finkelstein 
Inquiry was ‘too flawed, and needs too much fixing to trigger real 
reform’.
110
  Any initiative impacting on media regulation is by nature 
fraught, given the high premium democratic societies place on freedom of 
speech.  Concerns about regulatory inroads into freedom of speech are, 
not surprisingly, higher in the absence of constitutional safeguards for 
this freedom, as is the case in Australia.
111
  If it is any consolation, in 
what is currently the world’s most fertile of arena for media reform – in 
the theatre of the UK’s phone hacking scandal – answers were still being 
sought at the time of this writing despite a detailed inquiry and 
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